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DEATH BY NEGLIGENCE.
Several questions of difficulty have arisen as to the nature of the
damage which must be sustained in order to support an action under
Lord Campbell's Act, 9 & 10 Vicet. c. 93, for causing the death of
a relative by negligence.' It was decided soon after the passing of
1 The following is the provision of the English "Act for compensating the fami-
lies of persons killed by accidents," (26th August, 1846, 9 & 10 Victoria, c. 93.)
" That whensoever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act, neglect
or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had not ensued)
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in r;-
spect thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who would have been liable
if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages notwithstanding the
death of the person injured, although the death shall have been caused under such
circumstances as amount in law to felony.
That every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and
child of the person whose death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by
and in the name of the executor or administrator of the person deceased; and in
every such action the jury may give such damages as they may think proportioned
to the injury resulting from such death to the parties respectively for whom and!
for whose benefit such action shall be brought; and the amount so recovered, after-
deducting the costs not recovered from the defendant, shall be divided among the-
beforementioned parties in such shares as the jury by their verdict shall find an
direct." The reader may consult for the sake of the analogy, the " Actio noxalis"
of the Roman Law. See Inst. lib. iv., tit. 8; Sandar's Justinian, 565 ; 2 Du Caurroy's.
Inst., p. 427, 8th ed., 1851; 3 Ortalan's Inst., p. 681, 6th ed., 1857; La Grange.
Mare. de Droit Rom., 543, 7th ed.; Schrader's Inst., p. 682, ed. 1832, in 4to;
Gaius, lib. iv. pl. 75-80; p. 214, ed. Lack.-Eds. Am. Law Beg.
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the statute, that the jury, in assessing the amount, were confined to
the pecuniary loss, and could not take into consideration the mental
suffering of the survivors; Blake vs. The Midland Railway Com-
pany, 18 Q. B. 93; but it was not until lately that it was held that
a reasonable expectation of the continuance of pecuniary advantage,
wvithout any legal right to it, is sufficient for the maintenance of
this action. Such, however, is now the law as laid down by the
Court of Exchequer in F ranklin vs. The South-eastern Railway
Company, 4 Jur., N. S., part 1, p. 565, and by the Court of Com-
mon Pleas in Dalton vs. The South-eastern Railway Company, 4
Jur., N. S., part 1, p. 711. In the former of these cases the plain-
tiff sued as administrator of his son, who had been killed through
the negligence of the defendants. The plaintiff, a man of about
sixty years of age, was the porter at St. Thomas's Hospital ; the
son, who was twenty-three years of age, was in the habit of carrying
coals into the wards of the hospital, for which the father received
Ue. 6d. per week. There was no contract between them, but this
-state of things had continued for a long period. The jury having
returned a verdict for 751. damages, it was upheld by the court in
bane, although they considered that the damages were excessive.
The Lord Chief Baron, delivering the judgment of the court, said-
"It has been contended that the plaintiff must show a legal damage.
... . The statute does not in terms say on what principle the
action it gives is to be maintainable, nor on what principle the
damages are to be assessed; and the only way to ascertain what it
does is to show what it does not mean. Now, it is clear that damage
must be shown, for the jury are to ' give such damages as they may
think proportioned to the injury.' It has been held that these
damages are not to be given as a solatium, but are to be given in
-reference to a pecuniary loss. That was so decided for the first
time in bane in Blake vs. The Midland Railway Company, 18 Q.
B. 9. That case was tried before Parke, B., who told the jury
that the Lord Chief Baron had frequently ruled at Nisi Prius, and
-without objection, that the claim for damage must be founded on
pecuniary loss, actual or expected, and that mere injury to feelings
-could not be considered. It i also clear that the damages are not
to be given merely in reference to the loss of a legal right, for they
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are to be distributed-among relations only, and not among all indi-
viduals sustaining such a loss; and accordingly the practice has not
been to ascertain what benefit could have been enforced by the
claimants had the deceased lived, and to give damages limited
thereby. If, then, the damages are not to be calculated on either
of these principles, nothing remains except that they should be
calculated in reference to a reasonable expectation of pecuniary
benefit, as of right or otherwise, from the continuance of the life.
Whether the plaintiff had any such reasonable expectation of benefit
from the continuance of his son's life, and if so, to what extent,
were the questions left in this case to the jury. The proper question
then was left-if there was any evidence in support of the affirma-
tive of it. We think there was. The plaintiff was old, and getting
infirm; the son was young, earning good wages, and apparently
well disposed to assist his father, and, in fact, he had so assisted
him to the value of 3s. Gd. a week. We do not say that it was
necessary that actual benefit should have been derived-a reasonable
expectation is enough; and such reasonable expectation might well
exist, though, from the father not being in need, the son had never
done anything for him. On the other hand, a jury certainly ought
not to make a guess in the matter, but ought to be substantially
satisfied that there has been a loss of reasonable expectation of
sensible and appreciable pecuniary benefit which might have been
reasonably expected from the continuance of the life."
In Dalton vs. The South-eastern Bailway Company, the action
was also brought by the father on account of the death of his son.
The plaintiff was an agricultural laborer, and lived, with his wife
and a large family, in very humble circumstances. The deceased
son did not live with his father, but earned good wages at a piano-
forte maker's in London, and had been in the habit, for seven or
eight years, of visiting his parents once a fortnight, and making
them small presents. He had also contributed to their support by
becoming responsible to a butcher for the supply of some meat to
them. The plaintiff had incurred expense for the funeral of his
son and for mourning. The jury awarded to the plaintiff 1201. for
the loss sustained by the death, and 251. for the funeral and mourn-
ing expenses. This verdict was upheld in bane except as to the
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funeral expenses. WILLES, J., in delivering the judgment of the
court, said-" The great question in this case is disposed of by the
judgment of the Court of Exchequer in Franklin vs. The South-
eastern Railway Company, by which it is decided (with our entire
concurrence) that legal liability alone is not the test of injury in
respect of which damages may be recovered under Lord Campbell's
Act, but that the reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage by
the relation remaining alive may be taken into account by the jury,
and damages may be given in respect of that expectation being dis-
appointed, and the probable pecuniary loss thereby occasioned...
As to the expenses of the funeral and mourning, however, we think
they ought not to be allowed. The subject-matter of the statute is
compensation for injury by reason of the relative not being alive,
and there is no language in the statute referring to the ceremonial
of respect paid to the memory of the deceased in his funeral, or in
putting on mourning for his loss."'
2 London Jurist.
NOTE.-It is a dictate of justice that parties immediately interested in the life of
a person wrongfully killed by another should be compensated by him for the fatal
injury he has inflicted. Statutes have therefore been enacted in England and in
some American States, designed to compensate the persons having the greatest
pecuniary interest in the life of the deceased party, as the widow, children, heirs or
next of kin, for their pecuniary loss which they have thus suffered from the wrongful
act of another, the damages being usually limited to a certain amount; such statutes
even when applied to companies previously incorporated are constitutional, and
do not impair the obligation of the contract implied in the charter.
The remedy given may be an action against the wrong-doer for damages by the
administrator or executor of the deceased for the benefit of the interested relatives.
This is the remedy provided in England and by the statutes of New York, Pennsyl-
vania, Ohio and Indiana. See Indianapolis Railroad Co. vs. Bradshaw, 6 Ind. 146 ;
Madison and Indianapolis Railroad Co. vs. Beacon, id. 205. The provision of the
statute of Ohio, enacted 25th March, 1851, is the same as that of New York, with
merely verbal variations, except that in the first section the words "murder in the
first or second degree, or manslaughter," are substituted for felony, and the provision
for a criminal process is omitted, Swan's Stat. of Ohio, (1854,) pp. 707, 708. The
injury, in order to be actionable under the Statute of Ohio, must have been inflicted
within the State. Campbell vs. Rogers, 2 Handy, Superior Court of Cincinnaati, 110;
4 Am. Law Reg.747; 19 Law Rep. (Oct., 1856,) p. 329. A husband cannot, under it,
recover for the killing of his wife, or for the loss of her comfort, services.and society,
but may recover for the expenditures actually made in consequence of the fatal
injury. Worley vs. C. H. & D. R. R. Co. 1 Handy, 481. The act of New York limits its
